

Combined Staff Chiefs Plan

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3.—The Joint of the War Department statement announcing the establishment of a combined chiefs of staff group reads:

The "combined chiefs of staff group" has been established by the United States and Great Britain to insure complete coordination of the war effort of these two nations, including the production and distribution of their war supplies, and to provide for full British and American collaboration with the United Nations now associated in prosecution of the war against the Axis powers. The combined chiefs of staff as representatives of the United States and British military and naval effort, have two principal divisions—one is of the United States chiefs of staff, the other the British chiefs of staff.

United States membership of the combined chiefs of staff consists of:

Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations.

General George C. Marshall, chief of staff, United States Army.

Admiral E. J. King, commander in chief, United States Fleet.

Lieut. Gen. H. H. Arnold, chief of Army air forces.

The British chiefs of staff are represented in Washington by:

Field Marshal Sir John Dill (until recently chief of staff of the Imperial general staff).

Admiral Sir Charles Little.

Lieut. Gen. Sir Colville Wellesley.

Air Marshal A. T. Harris.

They are in constant communication with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the British chiefs of staff in London.

Secretaries Named for Group

Brig. Gen. W. B. Smith, formerly secretary of the War Department general staff, has been designated as United States secretary of the combined chiefs of staff and also as secretary for the joint board, and for many other boards and agencies established by the United States War and Navy Departments to insure coordination and unity in major strategic, direction and military operations. General Smith's staff of assistants, initially about eight officers, will be selected from officers of the

United States Army and United States Navy.

The British secretary of the combined chiefs of staff will be Brigadier V. Dykes, who served for some years as the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense and War Cabinet in London. He will be assisted by officers of the British Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force.

While the action of the combined chiefs of staff on broad strategic questions will be in the form of joint recommendations to the heads of their respective governments in minor and immediate matters relating to current operations they are prepared to take action without delay. The setup therefore amounts to a combined command post for the conduct of all joint operations of the two governments in the war. It will be the control agency for planning and coordinating.

Liaison for United Nations

In addition, it will provide a medium for adjusting such joint operations as involve other governments of the United Nations, such as China, the Netherlands, East India, Australia and New Zealand at the present moment.

The representatives of these governments will participate with the combined Chiefs of Staff in the consideration of matters concerning their national interests.

The organization described is being established in the Public Health Building on Constitution Avenue, directly opposite the War Department.

In addition, a most important factor in this setup will be the Munitions Assignments Board, of which Mr. Henry Hopkins is the chairman and Major Gen. James H. Burns, the executive, and which has its counterpart in London, both with British and United States membership. These proposals of these committees will be submitted to the combined Chiefs of Staff for their recommendation to the heads of their governments.

Mr. Hopkins's committee will also be established in the Public Health Building. In the same building will be representatives of the central agencies for allocate shipping and for the agency to allocate raw materials. Officers of other governments of the United Nations will be established in the same building.

... Australia, the New Zealand Government. The Combined Meteorological Committee had several subcommittees, including those on Equipment, Research and Development, Weather Communications, and Liaison.

Records.—See entry 12.

Combined Administrative Committee

This Committee, known also as CAAC, was established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in June 1943 to study and make recommendations concerning matters that were not within the scope of other combined agencies. It consisted of the Joint Administrative Committee (later the Joint Logistics Committee) and representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission. The Combined Administrative Committee was the primary logistics advisory and planning committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war.

Records.—See entry 12.

Combined Civil Affairs Committee

This Committee, known also as CCAC, was established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in July 1943 to recommend civil-affairs policies for enemy or enemy-held areas that were occupied by combined operations and to coordinate military and civilian agency interests in such matters. The United States membership consisted of one representative each of the Army, the Navy, and the State Department, with an additional civilian official who served as Chairman of the Committee. The British membership consisted of one representative of the Foreign Office, two from the British Joint Staff Mission, and one additional civilian expert. The Committee continued throughout the war.

The chief working group of the Committee was the Supply Subcommittee (CCAC/S), established in August 1943. The London Subcommittee (CCAC/L), established in January 1944, was charged with furnishing detailed guidance to the Allied forces in Europe.

Records.—See entry 12.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, known also as JCS, was created in view of the decision made during the Anglo-American military staff conference in Washington, December 1941-January 1942, to establish the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became the United States representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff; there the Joint Chiefs of Staff was in large degree the counterpart of the already existent British Chiefs of Staff Committee. In addition to the foregoing role, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the principal United States agency for coordination between the Army and the Navy. Although the older Joint Board did not go out of existence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff occasionally met and acted on a few residual matters in the name of the Board, in effect the Joint Chiefs of Staff superseded the Board and absorbed its functions.

Joint Chiefs of Staff as an organized body held on February 9, 1942. Its original members were the Chief of Operations, Admiral H. R. Stark; the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Gen. George C. Marshall; the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King; and the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold. In March 1942 the Chief of Naval Operations and of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet were combined in one person, Admiral King, reducing the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to three; but in a fourth member was again provided, namely, Admiral William D. Leahy, the newly appointed Chief of Staff to the President in respect to the role as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Thereafter, for certain changes in title, the membership remained unaltered.

The functions and duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally defined during the war period. The absence of any written definition of duties allowed great flexibility of organization and the extension of action in accordance with the requirements of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the President with regard to military strategy, the requirements of production, and allocation of munitions and shipping, the manpower needs of the armed forces, and matters of joint Army-Navy policy. Besides cooperating with the British as part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the direction of the President, made joint strategic plans and issued directives to implement them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible for the strategic conduct of the war in areas for which the United States had been assigned primary responsibility, as in the Pacific. It also supervised the operations of the Office of Strategic Services and the Army and Navy Staff College. During the war period the Joint Chiefs of Staff existed informally on the basis of these continuing functions. It was not until after the war that legislative recognition as a permanent agency by the National Security Act of 1947.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization included the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves, the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, the Secretariat, and a number of standing committees. Most of these standing committees were composed of part-time members, whose Joint Chiefs of Staff functions were auxiliary to their primary working assignments in the War or Navy Departments. Some of the standing committees were supported by full-time working subcommittees or staffs and also by *ad hoc* committees. Some of the committees, though not all, had corresponding Combined Chiefs of Staff counterparts. In most such cases the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee were the United States members of the corresponding Combined Chiefs of Staff committee. There were also many *ad hoc* committees and subcommittees at the Combined Chiefs of Staff level.

Records.—The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its committees, including the United States copies of the records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its committees, 1942-45, are in the custody of the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They extend to about 250 linear feet, including some duplicate papers, and consist of agenda, minutes, charters, membership rosters, memoranda of information, case papers, correspondence, working papers

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cellaneous records. The records are filed in general in accordance with the War Department Decimal File System, as modified to provide for papers of a joint or combined nature. For security reasons these records are not available to outside agencies or individuals.

For a general description of the form of Joint Chiefs of Staff records, see Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., "Wartime Developments in War Department Organization and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 5: 2-4 (winter 1945).

Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff, known also as JDCS, were organized as an executive agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1942 to implement established policies and to decide matters referred to them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Early in 1944, the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff were given cognizance over studies relating to the postwar organization of the armed forces. Originally consisting of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and the Chief of the Air Staff, membership was reduced to one representative each from the Army and the Navy in May 1943 and was continued on that basis throughout the war.

Records.—See entry 12.

Joint Secretariat

After it was decided in January 1942 to establish the Combined Chiefs of Staff, including a Combined Secretariat, the Joint Board recommended that a Joint Secretariat be organized to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to act as the United States part of the Combined Secretariat. This recommendation was approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in February, and the Joint Secretariat was organized at once. Composed of officers of the Army and Navy and headed by a Secretary from one service and a Deputy Secretary from the other service, the Joint Secretariat was the administrative agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, it was responsible for recording actions and decisions, issuing directives, maintaining liaison with other agencies, and performing the house-keeping functions required by the organization. The Joint Secretariat included the secretaries of the various committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where a committee was also a part of a Combined Chiefs of Staff agency, the same individual served as secretary of the committee and as the United States secretary of the combined committee.

Records.—See entry 12.

Joint Staff Planners

This committee, known also as JPS, was a continuation, under a new name and with enlarged membership, of the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board. Although the Joint Staff Planners received no charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff until May 1943, the committee met as early as February 13, 1942, and functioned regularly thereafter. Its duties varied somewhat as other committees were created or discontinued, but

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throughout the war it was the agency charged with preparing joint plans and furnishing strategic guidance to those agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the two services concerned with war plans. It represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Combined Staff Planners.

The members of the Joint Staff Planners, who also had heavy planning responsibilities within the War and Navy Departments, were assisted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions by a full-time subcommittee. This working committee, which was a continuation of the Joint Strategic Committee of the Joint Board, was given a directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 1942, and was first called the Joint United States Strategic Committee (not to be confused with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee). In May 1943 it was given a charter and was renamed the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), as it was known throughout the remainder of the war.

Records.—See entry 12.

Joint Intelligence Committee

This Committee, known also as JIC, was a continuation and enlargement of the Joint Board committee of the same name, which had been authorized in 1941. It received no charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff until May 1943, but it was given a directive and was reorganized early in March 1942. Even before this, on February 11, 1942, a Combined Chiefs of Staff paper had defined the duties and membership of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Its primary functions throughout the war period were to furnish intelligence in various forms to other agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to represent it on the Combined Intelligence Committee.

As originally constituted, the Joint Intelligence Committee was composed of the directors of the intelligence services of the Army and Navy and representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Economic Administration), and the Coordinator of Information (later the Director of Strategic Services). The charter of May 1943 added the director of the Intelligence Staff of the Army Air Forces. This membership remained unchanged throughout the remainder of the war.

The Joint Intelligence Committee was assisted by a full-time subcommittee and some ten or more special subcommittees. The permanent working staff was organized by the Committee early in 1942 as the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee (JISC). Its status was formalized in the charter of the Committee of May 1943. Two months later, the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee was renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS). The latter agency was given a charter by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1944 and operated under it throughout the remainder of the war.

Records.—See entry 12.

Joint Psychological Warfare Committee

This Committee, known also as JPWC, was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1942 to initiate and develop plans for psychological warfare and to coordinate the resultant psychological activities. Originally it consisted of two officers and

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NSC-67, including defining basic functions and structure as established in 1947-49 legislation

- (A) NSC direction via NSC In NSC/D's*
- (b) GAO/AAH General opinions*
- (c) Appropriations Action as Congressional Consent to Actions*

5758 Bill as passed House
returned Senate

July 21, 1947

H-Report (4214)
HR 4214

July 16, 47

July 15, 47

HR 3979

June 25, 47

DCI stated in HR 2319 - original bill

Before Senate Armed Services

April 29, 47

House Comm. on Exp. & Govt. May 1, 47

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House Debate

19 July 1947

22 July 1947

25 July 1947

Chairman stated to Committee on Expenditures 2 April 47

5 Feb 46 - discussion

Collection - Sub B -

P. 7569 (House Bill)

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and, on the basis of diplomatic understandings reached in the Moscow conference of October 1943, to bring representatives of the Soviet Union and China into the last international military conference of 1943 (SEXTANT-EUREKA: Cairo-Tehran). Soviet delegations subsequently participated in the semipolitical, semimilitary conferences of 1945, and British-American collaboration continually improved, but SEXTANT-EUREKA marked what probably was the high point of general co-ordination of Allied military plans during World War II.²²

*Development of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff System*²³

The second correlative effect of the successful development in 1942 of a device for co-ordinating American and British military plans was that the U. S. Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces simultaneously formed an organization to co-ordinate their own views for presentation to the British military leaders. This organization sprang up almost accidentally to answer the practical need for a joint committee system that would fit the pattern of the well-established British arrangements for interservice collaboration. Thus the United States found itself with a more highly developed staff system than ever before for developing military plans on a level of authority below the President. Like the Joint Board system it was a committee system and as such worked perfectly only when there was no irreconcilable disagreement among representatives of the

separate armed services. It was not the unified high command that had long been discussed inside and outside the army,²⁴ but it did provide a mechanism whereby the Army, the Navy, and the Army Air Forces could reach clear agreements or acceptable compromises on nearly all military matters. The pressing problems raised when the United States entered the war gave a new incentive to compromise in the common interest. It was patently advisable in the critical months after Pearl Harbor to avoid referring minor issues to the President and to present a common recommendation to the President as often as possible on policies important enough to require his approval as Commander in Chief. In addition to this incentive to unity, much of the strength of the new organization, soon known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), lay in the fact that, in contrast with the Joint Board, it had to present a common front to the British Chiefs of Staff on military plans affecting both nations.²⁵ In combination, the fact of war and the presence of Great Britain made this new staff system work well enough to meet the grave crises of 1942 and thereby to win the confidence and respect of President

²⁴ For a brief analysis of "Early Proposals for Unification of the Armed Services of the United States," see OPD Hist Unit Study I.

²⁵ The only Army papers on the organization of the U. S. Joint Chiefs were: (1) memo, CofS for Admirals Stark and King, 17 Feb 42, sub: JB, U. S. CsofS, WPD 4402-159 (Colonel Handy drafted this memorandum, which still provided for the "Commanding General Field Forces" as well as the Chief of Staff); (2) WPD study, n.d., title: Proposed Combined (U. S.-British) CsofS Orgn, Tab "Collaboration," Book 3, Exec 8; (3) WPD study, n.d., title: Proposed Joint (U. S. Army-Navy-Air) CsofS Orgn, Tab "Collaboration," Book 3, Exec 8.

For indication that these two studies are by WPD, see atchd memo, WPD for CofS, n.d., no sub, Tab "Collaboration," Book 3, Exec 8.

²² For SEXTANT, see Ch. XII. For Moscow conference and 1945 conferences, see Ch. XVI.

²³ Some of the developments reviewed in general under this heading are described in more detail, as they were related to the work of OPD, in several later chapters of this volume.

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representation, the Army Air Forces always had its own spokesman in these American staff groups. The American committees studied, reported, and investigated military matters for the benefit of the U. S. JCS at the same time that they were representing the United States on the combined committees.

The JCS-CCS machinery became more and more comprehensive and more and more specialized as the war went on. In time there were combined committees for logistics, intelligence, transportation, communications, munitions allocation, meteorology, shipbuilding, and civil affairs (occupation and military government). From the point of view of Army operations, the most important of these were the committees dealing with the problem of allocating and moving munitions, troops, and supplies in conformity with operational plans. In addition, the joint and combined machinery throughout World War II contained the committees primarily responsible for assisting the Chiefs of Staff in planning the strategic conduct of the war—the Joint Staff Planners and Combined Staff Planners (JPS and CPS), and also, for the United States, a working subcommittee of the Joint Staff Planners.

The membership of the CPS consisted of three British officers, Army, Navy, and Air, and four American officers, Army, Navy, Army Air, and Navy Air, who constituted the U. S. JPS. Both the JPS and the CPS were central co-ordinating groups through which many policy papers prepared in other committees reached the JCS or the CCS. They received directives from the JCS and the CCS and often delegated work to other committees. Particularly during 1942, they were not exclusively strategic planners but also co-ordinators in all kinds of joint and

combined matters that had a bearing on high policy. The U. S. Army planner on both the JPS and the CPS committees was originally the WPD chief, General Gerow. When General Eisenhower succeeded General Gerow as WPD chief in February 1942, he immediately delegated the position of Army planner to the chief of the Strategy & Policy Group, and thereafter left most of the routine of joint planning to him.³⁹ While the chief of the Division thus had no formal place in the JCS and CCS system, he exerted great influence in it through the Army planner and, indirectly, through the Chief of Staff.

The U. S. JPS drew heavily upon the services of its working war plans committee, which ranged in number at various times between eight and eighteen members. This committee originally was called the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee (JUSSC), and OPD supplied all of the three or four Army (including Army Air) representatives on it. The JUSSC concerned itself primarily with broad strategic planning on the joint level and related policy matters such as mobilization and use of manpower by the three services. The more technical task of drawing up joint strategic and operational plans and adjusting them in conformity to theater needs became increasingly important in the latter part of 1942, and the committee was reorganized as the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) early in 1943. The JWPC

³⁹ (1) U. S. Serial ABC-4/CS4, title: Post-ARCADIA Collaboration, ARCADIA: Proceedings. (2) Rosters of CCS committees, copies filed ABC 381 United Nations (1-23-42), 6-A. Initially General Handy was Army planner. When he succeeded General Eisenhower as chief of the Division in June 1942, General Wedemeyer became Army planner. OPD furnished two subsequent Army planners in World War II, Brig. Gens. F. N. Roberts and G. A. Lincoln. For joint planning later in the war, see Ch. XIII.

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by the Theater Group, on behalf of the Chief of Staff. Only insofar as impending decisions affecting the overseas theaters hinged on world-wide strategy being worked out in the JCS-CCS system were they of primary interest to S&P.

The redefinition of levels of planning along these lines served to stabilize CPD's internal organization and assignment of duties. There was no further evolution of the kind whereby Future Operations, S&P, had merged completely with the European Section, Theater Group. During the TORCH period and afterwards, S&P officers were mainly concerned with joint and combined planning, and theater section officers took care of every other problem referred to the Chief of Staff's command post. This system had the administrative virtues of stability and simplicity. It greatly facilitated the development of needed new techniques in joint planning in 1943, as well as the maintenance of close contacts with the huge overseas forces of the later war years.

Staff Work in the Joint Committee System

As a result of the shift in the focus of its work in the TORCH period, S&P began to develop its techniques for planning in the joint committee system. The Strategy Section provided the Army planner (the S&P chief) with a special staff for strategic study and advice. But the Army planner and the Chief of Staff, in their joint and combined capacities, had to face many policy problems being considered on the interservice and international level that were not strictly strategic and often were not strategic at all. These issues ranged from psychological warfare policy to systems of Army-Navy and Allied command. To make studies and recommendations on such miscellaneous

matters was the function of the Combined Subjects Section. WPD had always dealt with Army-Navy problems for the War Department and from time to time had centralized this function in one of its planning sections. By mid-1942, however, the S&P Group had established a more systematic handling of joint and combined papers than had ever existed before. Whereas the Strategy Section reviewed studies on strategy, including joint and combined papers, and contributed ideas on strategy to these studies, the Combined Subjects Section had a more generalized responsibility of reviewing and making recommendations on any kind of paper which came under joint and combined consideration. Its officers prepared studies only on nonstrategic subjects, but the section co-ordinated all JCS-CCS paper work. It kept for reference and research the only comprehensive War Department file of joint and combined staff papers. While no clear line could be drawn between subjects properly classified as strategy and those that were not, close liaison between the sections made it possible for the group chief and his assistants to co-ordinate their work effectively.

The Combined Subjects Section in the latter part of 1942 not only had the task of studying and recommending appropriate action on matters under consideration or that ought to be considered in the JCS system, but also of initiating appropriate War Department action to carry into effect decisions reached by the JCS or the CCS. Ordinarily this implementation function, as it came to be called, was discharged by distributing JCS and CCS papers or directives based on JCS or CCS actions. A great deal of this work amounted merely to sending JCS directives to the Strategy Section or to the theater sections inside OPD, but on

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porting actions taken to the JCS secretariat, which had been "charged with the responsibility of following up directives issued to the Army and the Navy."⁷

On the following day this duty was formally delegated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, to the Combined Subjects Section. This section was charged with reviewing all joint and combined papers and initiating War Department action either by transferring them to another section of OPD authorized to issue the appropriate instructions or by preparing a supplementary directive to be issued formally by OPD to the Army agency which could appropriately take the necessary action.⁸ This procedure was described in a directive distributed on 16 January 1943 throughout the War Department and to the JCS secretariat:

All joint and combined decisions requiring implementation by the War Department are sent to the Operations Division, WDGS. The Combined Subjects Section, OPD, either implements these decisions or forwards them with additional background, to the proper War Department agency for the necessary action. This Section also is charged with following up directives and decisions emanating from the Secretariat, Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, and also from the Secretary, Joint U. S. Communications Board. Periodic reports of War Department action are made to the several secretaries through the Office Chief of Staff.

Matters affecting both the Army and the Navy on which a decision is required by either the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, or by the Joint U. S. Communications Board, will be prepared in the form of a brief memorandum for the Chief of Staff, through the Combined

Subjects Section, OPD, which acts as a coordinating agency for the Chief of Staff in these matters.⁹

The second half of 1942, in comparison with the first half, was a period of uncertainty and diminished drive in joint planning. The change was largely a reflection of the confusion that had resulted from the collision of the BOLERO plan, never canceled, with the operational requirements of TORCH. This was especially apparent in joint planning below the level of the Army planner, who had plenty of joint decisions to consider, that is, at the level of the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee, which was supposed to help him study them in detail. Whereas in February and March the JUSSC had drafted the basic studies on Pacific deployment versus the BOLERO concentration in Europe, comparatively few of the major JCS decisions between June and December were based on studies prepared by the JUSSC. This change came about primarily because the major decisions concerning TORCH were worked out on the level of the CCS or heads of government, and Army-Navy debates over Pacific operations centered less in differences of strategic opinion than in disputes about command responsibilities as between General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific area and Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean area, and the allocation of critical resources to operations in each area. Many of these matters could be settled only through personal dis-

⁷ Ltr, SGS to G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, OPD, AAF, AGF, SOS, and Secy JCS, 10 Sep 42, sub: Implementation of Decisions of JCS and CCS, WDCSA 334 JCS (1942).

⁸ OPD adm memo, 11 Sep 42, sub: Implementation and Follow-up of U. S. JCS and CCS Directives, Paper 34, Item 2B, OPD Hist Unit file.

⁹ (1) Ltr, SGS to WDGS Divs, AAF, AGF, SOS, Secy JCS, and Secy JCB, 16 Jan 43, sub: Submission of Papers to U. S. JCS or JCB, OPD 312, 40.

(2) See also memo, Lt Col J. K. Woolnough for Combined Subjects Sec, 2 Apr 43, sub: Procedure for Implementing Action on JCS and CCS Papers, with JCS M/I 48, in ABC 381 United Nations (23 Jan 43), 2.

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that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with fair promise of continuing in their role of directing strategically the course of this war. I have the greatest admiration, as I indicated above, and if I were a Britisher I would feel very proud. However, as an American I wish that we might be more glib and better organized to cope with these super negotiators. From a worm's eye viewpoint it was apparent that we were confronted by generations and generations of experience in committee work and in rationalizing points of views. They had us on the defensive practically all the time.²

The moral was plain—that the military staffs of the United States, in preparing for later meetings, should not only emulate but also improve on British thoroughness and firmness in interservice agreement. An essential part of this preparation would be thorough realistic staff planning on a joint basis which would permit the JCS to arrive at timely, binding agreements on the military course to be followed in the Pacific and its proper relationship to combined operations under consideration in other areas.

Reorganization of the Joint Staff System

General McNarney hastened the process of development in joint planning techniques by proposing early in January 1943 an investigation of the JCS and all its subordinate agencies.³ For all the prominence that had been given to interservice planning, little had been done in 1942 to define the existing terms of reference of the JCS and its committees. The key committees, the JCS and the JPS, did not even have charters.

The imperfect functioning of the joint committee system was particularly evident

² Pers ltr, Brig Gen Wedemeyer to Maj Gen Handy, 22 Jan 43, Paper 5, Item 1A, Exec 3.

³ JCS 202, 16 Jan 43, title: War Planning Agencies.

at the level of the JPS. The JCS secretariat listed the symptoms:

Their studies and recommendations have, perhaps, not always represented the best and most expert thought on the subject at hand.

At times they have become factional regarding the interests of their respective services as a cumulative result of attempting to compose disagreements.

They have sometimes entered on their deliberations with instructions from higher authority or with fixed and preconceived ideas.

The members who are authorized to come to an agreed recommendation have frequently been too busy to attend meetings. The result has been that the conclusions arrived at during such meetings have been nullified through the veto of a member who reviewed the paper following the regular session of the committee.

The general cause of these weaknesses lay in the effort by the JPS to do more than could be done by so small a committee, especially one whose members had many other responsibilities in their separate and distinct capacities as Army and Navy officers assigned to specific staffs in their respective services. As a result, the JPS had fallen far behind in its work and had acquired too many additional (nonvoting) members. The secretariat recommended that the JPS members should not themselves try to arrive at agreed solutions of the manifold problems that came before them but instead merely review solutions as submitted by subordinate working committees and either transmit them to the JCS or agree to recommit the problem to the working committees.⁴

⁴ Annex B, JCS 202, 16 Jan 43, title: Draft Proposal Prepared by JCS Secretariat Suggesting that it be Referred to JCS by CofS, U. S. Army, 16 Jan 43. General Wedemeyer at the same time presented recommendations toward the same end. See memo, Brig Gen Wedemeyer for CofS, 7 Jan 43, sub: Reconstitution of Supporting Planning Agencies of JCS, Annex C, JCS 202, 16 Jan 43. Cf. OPD paper, Miss Alice Miller and Maj D. C. Fahey, Jr., 22 Oct

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intelligence missions with foreign governments, the administration of civil affairs in occupied countries, and the definition of surrender terms for defeated enemies. There were special joint committees to study problems in some of these fields, but the JPS had to review the issues involved, whatever they were, from a strategic point of view, since in fact nearly everything the JCS might decide would have strategic implications.⁶ Under these circumstances, in order to deal with the main current questions of strategy and closely related military policy, the members of the JPS were more than willing to leave to other committees much of the work in fields like logistics planning. They mainly concerned themselves with reviewing, either collectively or individually, all important papers under consideration by the JCS, thereby making certain that the central thread of joint strategy was running through and tying together all the various kinds of joint planning.

By working along these lines, the four members of the reorganized JPS were able to deal with a host of problems as diverse as ever, but at the same time to reduce sharply the number of issues which had to be thrashed out in the first instance in JPS committee meetings.⁷ It was increasingly neces-

sary for the members of the JPS to trust one another and their junior staff members because the job of planning the war had become so big and so urgent that they no longer could take time to study in detail and to argue at length matters which only a few months before had been their intimate personal business, the outline of operational plans and deployment schedules. In order to guide the entire effort of the joint committee system and keep it in harmony with the commitments, intentions, and expectations of the JCS, they had to learn to regard military strategy as simply one of several specialized fields of planning. Though it remained for them the most important field, it was also for them and for their subordinates the most familiar field with comparatively firm standards of achievement. Particularly with respect to Pacific strategy, they came to delegate most of their planning in this field to the subordinate Joint War Plans Committee.⁸

The Joint War Plans Committee

The need of the JPS for timely, detailed, agreed studies on deployment and future operations was one of the main points made in the report on the joint committee system. It found that there was no agency charged with the "preparations of joint plans of a lesser scope than that of broad strategy." Such plans, termed war plans, had been prepared by independent planning staffs of the Army and Navy without the benefit of joint action. Only rarely, and then by temporary subcommittees, had a synthesis been made of the war plans prepared by the two . . .

⁸ The planners individually went on using their own staffs, of course. They also continued to appoint *ad hoc* subcommittees, mainly to deal with questions of policy, many of which did not fall within the scope of any of the standing subcommittees in the JCS system.

⁶ The continuing concern of the Army planner with many kinds of joint planning was shown by the fact that the Policy Section had about as much staff work to do for the chief of S&P as the Strategy Section did.

⁷ From the late spring of 1943 throughout the rest of the period of hostilities, membership on the JPS regularly went with four staff positions in the services. The Army planner was chief of S&P, OPD. The Army Air planner was Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Air Staff. The Navy planner was Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Office of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet (COMINCH). The second Navy member, who brought the Army-Navy strength into balance, normally (beginning in June 1943) was his immediate subordinate, the Assistant Planning Officer (Air), Plans, COMINCH.

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98 + 103

169 + 171

237 + 239

Vol 15

Vol. 11 not done

199 - (Protecting intelligence source - methods from unauthorized disclosure 102(d)3 suggests that has statutory responsibility but no authority except that which is inherent in his command of agency - the NSC can cloth you with authority but can't conduct process 102(d)3 enie

"internal security" functions -

raises interesting point into meaning of "internal security"

That unless
no specific authority
- adapt specific
authority of others
with dis-
- Res. can

§13 - That 102(d)5 is ~~not~~ restricted by the word intelligence.

Therefore, no statutory authority to engage in cold war activities, using Pres. prerogative (Ex. Pol. Pres. Ch. 17 art. 1 to take action to protect national interest) but need money for this

purpose from Congress can't spend under 102(d)5 authority.

Receives BOB for performance of 102-303 functions (intelligence) otherwise can't receive a 2nd Cong. approval.

76 - Section 8 in ⁽¹⁾ specified purposes,
(para 10)

(2) adapt purpose

but if doesn't exist and not specified,

is word "including" limiting or not

right is and not specified or existing

"essential to its function" with implicitly mean what it needs

but allows for (as there by history in that part)

spend

Vol. 14

118 - Section 8(b) is substantive authority whether understood or
ununderstood,

✓ 50 - 102 (4)(5) basis for espionage - could espionage beget a
history repeated - page 2 of memo

221 - DDCI's authority (drug business or described by

16 - that 102 (4)(3) legitimate history on means of Rept. & tell.

133 (Agency Duties

Vol 12

21 - Personal Policy - turn / days men down

XT 44 - Espionage law

202-

~~109~~

Vol. 13

203 - Good shot reviewing legal authorities

~~help to~~
 The Department of Defense, 1957
 Hearing Before Subcommittee of the
 Committee on Appropriations House of
 Representatives 84th 2d Part I

69 Stat. 349

Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations

"The Congress recognized the Agency's need for a headquarters building by authorizing 46 million for its construction + 8.5 million for the extension of the G.W. Mem. Pway from Spout Run to Langley Va. if the Agency finally selected the Langley property!"

"The Congress initially appropriated 69 Stat. 453, 5.5 million, with the understanding, as communicated to the Agency, that 3 million of the sum was for the preparation of detailed plans and specifications for the headquarters installation and 2.5 million for acquiring right-of-way and initiating construction of the parkway."

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p 240

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Use attached memo.

SECRET

LEGAL STATUS AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NEW CIA HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

1. Very soon after the establishment of CIA in 1947, serious thought was given to proper housing of the Agency since even at that time Agency personnel were scattered in numerous buildings at varied locations and for the most part in temporary buildings. New impetus was given to solving this problem with the advent of the Korean war and build up of the number of personnel in the Agency. The security hazards in transporting documents between buildings and the physical security hazards in the temporary buildings were stressed along with the economy and efficiency in presenting a justification which resulted in an authorization by the Congress for \$38,000,000 in the Military Construction Act, P.L. 82-155, 28 September 1951. At that time no site had been chosen nor had any plans been drawn. In considering the problem of securing appropriations it was determined not feasible to secure funds until a site selection was made and plans had been drawn. No decisions were reached and the authorization eventually lapsed.

2. Continuing thought was given to this problem and by letter, dated 1 July 1955, the President forwarded to the Congress proposed legislation containing an authorization for \$59,500,000 of which \$50,000,000 was to be for actual construction of the building. P.L. 84-61 was approved on 15 July 1955 and provided in part as follows:

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SECRET

Department of Interior was inappropriate and the Attorney General concluded "that the new building must be made available to the agencies for whom they were constructed...

The new buildings are to be used by the Agency for whom they were constructed so far as their needs reasonably require."

Use of space by another agency in the new CIA building while at the same time space is being acquired for CIA personnel in the Washington area with appropriated funds is not only open to legal objection but raises many potential problems with respect to frustration of the intent of Congress

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~~As noted in Tab A,~~ The Joint Committee undertook a complete revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 during the second session of the 83rd Congress (P.L. 703). Lengthy discussions were held between CIA and the AEC to reach agreement on language which would give CIA greater latitude in the development and exchange of intelligence in the field of foreign atomic energy. The agreed on language was redrafted by the staff of the Joint Committee and became Section 142(e) of the new act. ~~As pointed out in Tab A,~~ The Joint Committee also gave consideration to the inclusion of CIA in the Atomic Weapons Awards Act of 1954 which failed of final passage.

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- 126-A.
- a. Legislation *which may affect CIA.*
- i. Public Bills.

The work in this field includes introduction, and securing passage, of legislation which the Agency requires. In the 83rd Congress, CIA requested legislation to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to authorize the appointment of a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. This bill became Public Law 15 on 4 April 1953. In addition, CIA requested two provisions which were included in the Act to provide certain employment benefits for employees of the Federal Government (Public Law 763, 1 September 1954). These provisions exempted CIA from the Performance Rating Act of 1950 and repealed Section 9 of the CIA Act of 1949 which was no longer required by the Agency. In addition, a section to provide for the handling of foreign atomic energy information was included in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 at CIA request.

Other bills were introduced into the Congress which included specific reference to CIA, and appropriate action had to be considered in each case. These proposals included the various bills to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Atomic Weapons Awards Act of 1954, the resolution to provide for loyalty checks on Senate

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Public Law 85-507, the "Government Employees Training Act," approved by the President on 7 July 1958, repealed Section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.¹ This section reads as follows:

Sec. 4. (a) Any officer or employee of the Agency may be assigned or detailed for special instruction, research, or training, at or with domestic or foreign public or private institutions; trade, labor, agricultural, or scientific associations; courses or training programs under the National Military Establishment; or commercial firms.

(b) The Agency shall, under such regulations as the Director may prescribe, pay the tuition and other expenses of officers and employees of the Agency assigned or detailed in accordance with provisions of subsection (a) of this section, in addition to the pay and allowances to which such officers and employees may be otherwise entitled.

Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the Act² were renumbered as sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, respectively.

The bill in its final form was passed without the approval of, or consultation with, CIA, and after the Agency had strenuously objected in past years to other bills which similarly sought to repeal Section 4.

¹ 63 Stat. 208; 50 USC 403d

² Section ~~SECTION~~ 9 had previously been repealed by P. L. 763-83

agencies, I shall not object further to its approval by the President provided it is assured that this Agency will be granted the broadest possible exceptions immediately upon the bill becoming law. I should also like to reserve the right to request the Administration and the Congress at some later date to enact legislation which would reinstate the repealed provisions of P. L. 110.

Public Law 86-707, ^{Sept. 6, 1960}
^{74 Stat. 192}

The Overseas Differentials and
~~Allowances Act~~ was the

~~major~~ legislation during

the 1950's ~~with the~~ most import

to CIA. It directly amended several

sections of the Central Intelligence Agency

Act of 1949, including paragraphs

(D) and (E) of Section 4 ^{*[63 Stat. 209, 72 Stat. 337]}
 50 U.S.C. 403e (D) and (E) ^(rev) that part of

^{*[63 Stat. 209, 73 Stat. 337; 50 U.S.C. 403e]}

Section 4 (a) which precedes paragraph (1),

paragraph 4 of Section 4, ^{*[63 Stat. 210, 73 Stat. 337, 50 U.S.C. 403e]} Section 1 (c),

^[63 Stat. 208; 50 U.S.C. 403a(c)]

paragraph (1)(A) of Section 4, paragraph

^{*[63 Stat. 209 and 210; 72 Stat. 337; 50 U.S.C. 403e (A)(4)]} ^{*[63 Stat. 209, 72 Stat. 337; 50 U.S.C. 403e (A)(4)]}

(3)(A) of Section 4, paragraph (3)(B)

WV 48815

*[63 Stat. 210; 72 Stat. 337; 50 U.S.C. 403e(3)(8)]

of Section 4¹, paragraph (3)(C)

*[63 Stat. 210; 72 Stat. 337; 50 U.S.C. 403e(3)(C)]

of Section 4¹ ~~is~~ revealed

Sections 1(d) and 4(b) * [63 Stat. 208 and 211; 50 U.S.C. 403a(d) and 403e(b)]

This legislation ~~was~~ developed over a period of more than four years through a cooperative effort of a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Intelligence and the Executive Committee of the House of Representatives. A predecessor of the bill which

was enacted had been introduced in

bill

privately leased residences,
cost-of-living allowance, transfer
allowance, separation allowance,
education allowance including tuition
expenses and transportation to the
United States, post differential not
to exceed 25 per cent. Additionally
it made available representation

allowances, permitted the storage of
furniture and household and personal effects
of all Government employees stationed at posts anywhere
^{outside the continental U.S.}
without regard to emergency conditions.

based solely on the criteria of a place
to which ^{the furniture and household and personal effects} ~~they~~ could not be taken or not
be used, and permitted shipment of motor

vehicles to posts of duty outside the continental U.S. Finally it amended the Annual and Sick Leave Act to grant ^{employees of} to "all Government agencies" ^{at any time outside the U.S.} the home leave benefits now available to the Foreign Service.

In 1959 a revised version of this bill was introduced in the 86th Congress by Congressman James H. Morrison. In addition to the coverage of the 1958 bill H.R. 5007, this ^{new} bill included in Section 31(a) a definition of perquisites and household and personal effects which was recommended by the State Department and CIA.

Energy ~~This bill~~ was introduced to provide for awards to persons furnishing original information to the United States regarding the introduction of special nuclear material or atomic weapons into the United States. The ^{Joint} Committee ~~on Atomic~~ amended the bill to make the Director of Central Intelligence a member of the awards board ^{which} ~~to~~ determining the merits of claims for the rewards. The bill was also amended to make the Director jointly responsible with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General in determining whether an alien may be admitted into the United States for permanent residence for furnishing such information. The bill was further amended to make the Director responsible for payment of the awards out of appropriated funds. At the request of the Joint Committee, CIA appeared before ^{it} ~~them~~ during ~~their~~ consideration of this measure and, while we indicated that we would prefer not to include CIA in its provisions, the Committee insisted on the amendments noted above. The bill failed of passage.

(d) S. Res. 16 was introduced to provide for loyalty checks on Senate employees. As originally drafted, this bill provided that the names of these employees be transmitted to the FBI, the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and CIA for any derogatory information in the possession of such agencies concerning the loyalty of such employees. Legislative Counsel explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee Counsel that this was purely an internal security matter, from which CIA was barred by statute, and CIA was stricken from the bill as reported by the Committee.

(e) H.R. 9736, to establish uniform weight allowances governing the transportation at government expense of property of Government officers and employees. This bill involves the transportation of the household goods, automobiles, and private effects of Government employees transferred to U. S. field or overseas stations. CIA was consulted by the Bureau of the Budget in certain phases of the drafting of this legislation and certain

3-A

Stephanie
The material drawn
in bottom line
is what I've
looked at & found
to be N/A



ILLEG B

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
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STAT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		X INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Per our telecon last Friday, herewith are two references (with Xerox copies), from two official histories, on the beginnings of the JCS in 1942 and its relationship to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its later charters in 1942-43. (1) National Archives, <u>Federal Records of World War II</u> , Vol. II, (1951), pp.6-9; and (2) Ray S. Cline, <u>Washington Command Post: The Operations Division</u> , (U.S. Army in World War II series, 1951), pp. 98-103, 169-71, 237-39. Although President Roosevelt did not issue an Executive Order or military order					
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Historical Staff				6 Dec 1965	
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in 1942 on the JCS (as explained by Cline on p. 99n), the War Department did issue a formal announcement, on 6 Feb 1942, on the functions of what was initially called the "Combined Chiefs of Staff Group" and on its joint U.S. counterparts. (Attached text from New York Times, 7 Feb. 1942.) In this CCS organization, the U.S. members were variously called initially, the "U.S. Chiefs of Staff" and the "Joint Board." Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, by the way, was secretary both of the combined and joint staffs.